Kunngerð nr. 226 frá 30. desember 2025 um broyting í kunngerð um avmarkandi tiltøk

Name

Identifying information

Statement of Reasons

Date of listing

1.

Artem Sergeevich KUREEV

(Russian: Артём Сергеевич КУРЕЕВ)

Officer of the 5th Service of the Federal Security Service, Editor-in-chief of the ‘African Initative’, Founder of ‘Rusafro’

DOB: 24.10.1980

POB: USSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Passport number: 4002209800

Tax Identification Number (INN): 782500167259

Artem Sergeevich Kureev is a Russian Federal Security Service officer involved in malign activities, namely coordinated disinformation campaigns, both in Europe and Africa. He conducts influence campaigns in Europe, including by organising the dissemination of articles in Russian and their English translations on proxy websites and making payments for the publication of pro-Russian articles, with the aim of spreading Russian disinformation in Europe. He founded two media outlets in Africa and conducted deliberate disinformation campaigns aiming at undermining Western health projects in Africa by spreading conspiracy theories such as the alleged use of Africa for biological warfare experiments and illicit trials of various drugs by Western pharmaceutical companies.

Therefore, Artem Sergeevich Kureev is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

16.12.2024

2.

Nikolai Aleksandrovich TUPIKIN

(russisk: Николай Александрович ТУПИКИН)

Executive director of the Structura National Technologies a.k.a. GK Struktura

POB: USSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Tax Identification Number (INN): 773402066160

Nikolai Aleksandrovich Tupikin is the head and founder of Structura National Technologies (GK Struktura). The company has been involved in the so-called ‘Doppelganger’ campaign, a Russian-led digital disinformation campaign aimed at manipulating information and spreading disinformation in support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and targeting the Union’s Member States, the United States and Ukraine. He works in close coordination with the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. He has also been one of the key figures in Russia’s disinformation campaign across Latin America aiming at undermining support for Ukraine.

Therefore, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Tupikin is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. He is also associated with Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova, department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure.

16.12.2024

3.

Sofia Avraamovna ZAKHAROVA

(Russian: София Авраамовна ЗАХАРОВА)

Department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure

POB: USSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: female

Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova is the department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure. She has been involved in the so-called ‘Doppelganger’ campaign aimed at manipulating information and spreading disinformation in support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and targeting the Union’s Member States, the United States and Ukraine. She has been working directly with Ilya Gambashidze and Nikolai Tupikin, heads of Social Design Agency and GK Struktura, respectively, on this operation. She has also been one of the team leaders and active members of the so-called ‘Team I’ lead by Ilya Gambashidze, which stands behind the Kremlin’s campaign for disinformation in the West, interfering in the elections of different countries, and is preparing projects to discredit the Russian opposition.

Therefore, Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

16.12.2024

4.

Andrey Vladimirovich AVERYANOV

(Russian: Андрей Владимирович АВЕРЬЯНОВ)

Commander of GRU unit 29155

Major General

DOB: 29.9.1967

POB: USSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Tax Identification Number (INN): 773378888007

Andrey Vladimirovich Averyanov is a high-ranking military official of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). After the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the restructuring of the Wagner Group, the command of Russian military operations in Africa was restructured and placed under the Africa Corps under the umbrella of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and Averyanov was placed in charge of the operations. In many African countries, Russian forces provide security to military juntas that have overthrown legitimate democratic governments, gravely worsening the stability, security and democracy of the countries.

In addition, Russian forces in Africa exploit the natural resources there to finance their operations. In the beginning of 2024, Russian forces took control of the Intahaka gold mine in Mali.

Therefore, Andrey Vladimirovich Averyanov is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in third countries by undermining the democratic political process in the African countries where Russian forces operate and by exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources and wildlife in a third country.

16.12.2024

5.

Tinatin Givievna KANDELAKI

a.k.a.

Tina KANDELAKI

(Russian: Тинатин Гивиевна КАНДЕЛАКИ)

Journalist, public figure, celebrity, TV presenter and producer, Deputy General Director of Gazprom Media Holding

DOB: 10.11.1975

POB: Tbilisi, Georgian SSR (now Georgia)

Nationality: Georgian

Gender: female

Tinatin Givievna Kandelaki is a Russian journalist employed by the state-owned company Gazprom Media, and a public figure who has been using her popularity and influence in the public sphere to voice Russian propaganda and to justify the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. She was among those who performed during the Luzhniki stadium concert of 18 March 2022 that marked the 8th anniversary of the illegal annexation of Crimea and served as a symbol of support for the ongoing war in Ukraine. After 2014, she fully supported the illegal annexation of Crimea. Moreover, she is a Deputy General Director of Gazprom Media Holding, a holding of several media outlets that spread anti-Ukrainian propaganda and justify Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Several TV channels owned and governed by Gazprom Media Holding have replaced Ukrainian TV outlets on local TV frequencies previously seized forcefully by Russians after the Russian invasion of Crimea and have thus actively participated in the process of the illegal annexation of Crimea.

Therefore, Tinatin Givievna Kandelaki is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation, or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

16.12.2024

6.

Vladimir Vladimirovich SERGIYENKO

(Russian: Владимир Владимирович СЕРГИЕНКО)

Former assistant of Member of Bundestag Eugen Schmidt

DOB: 23.5.1971

POB: Lviv, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine)

Nationality: Russian / Ukrainian

Gender: male

Vladimir Vladimirovich Sergiyenko is a former parliamentary assistant of the Member of the German Bundestag, Eugen Schmidt. In parallel, Sergiyenko actively colluded with Russian intelligence officers seeking to leverage his privileged parliamentary and political access to the detriment of the democratic political process and constitutional order of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Therefore, Vladimir Vladimirovich Sergiyenko implemented and supported actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law and security in the Federal Republic of Germany by engaging in, directly or indirectly, the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process.

16.12.2024

7.

Denis Alexandrovich SMOLYANINOV

(Russian: Денис Александрович СМОЛЯНИНОВ)

GRU colonel

DOB: 26.8.1976

POB: Chelyabinsk, USSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Passport number: 672904784466

Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov is a GRU colonel who specialises in psychological operations. He is in charge of the Ukrainian direction of the GRU. Lists of mercenaries to be sent to the Donbass passed through the Ukrainian direction. He also supervised two private military companies (PMCs) associated with the Ministry of Defense: Longifolia, a military company of crime bosses from the 1990s, through which contacts were established with Western PMCs, and Convoy, the military security company. Shortly before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he deployed an agent network in Ukraine. He uses Telegram channels to spread disinformation, including in Ukraine. Through social media he recruits agents for sabotage activities in the Union and other activities aimed at creating tensions between NATO countries.

The GRU is responsible for actively preparing explosions, arson and damage to infrastructure on Union territory, with the goal of slowing down the supply of weapons to Ukraine and of creating discord and the appearance of dissatisfaction with support for Ukraine in Europe.

Therefore, Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing acts of violence, and by facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

16.12.2024

8.

Vladimir/ Volodymyr LIPCHENKO

(Russian: Володимир ЛИПЧЕНКО)

GRU officer

DOB: 28.9.1974

POB: Mykolaiv, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Passport number: 4015400649

Vladimir Lipchenko is a GRU officer responsible for hybrid attacks in Europe under his pseudonym ‘Wlodek Lyakh’. He is part of a special department led by GRU Colonel Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov, set up to conduct sabotage activities in Western countries. He recruited a person to set fire to the Museum of the Occupation in Riga by throwing Molotov cocktails.

Therefore, Vladimir Lipchenko is responsible for or implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union by planning and directing acts of violence.

16.12.2024

9.

Yuriy SIZOV

(Russian: Юрий СИЗОВ)

GRU military officer

DOB: 17.2.1988

POB: St. Petersburg, USSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Passport number: 784805190577

Yuriy Sizov is a GRU military officer. He serves in military unit No 92154. He personally gave instructions to recruit agents to target a hypermarket in Kyiv and recorded a video tutorial on installing an explosive device in one of the stores of the same chain in the Moscow region. He was also responsible for orchestrating sabotage in Ukraine in the Lviv region in February 2024. He supervised and gave orders to the Russian intelligence agents involved in the planned sabotage activity.

Therefore, Yuriy Sizov is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union by planning and directing acts of violence.

16.12.2024

10.

Visa Nokhayevich MIZAEV

(Виса Нохаевич МИЗАЕВ)

a.k.a.

Vishan Nochaevic MIZAYEV;

Vysa Nokhaevich MIZAEV;

Visa Nokhaievych MIZAIEV;

Oleg SHISHKIN

Entrepreneur

DOB: 9.7.1963

POB: Grozny, USSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Passport No 753870064 (Russian Federation)

Passport No PRE0018440 (Federation of Saint Christopher and Nevis)

Tax Identification Number (INN): 481101523410

Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev is a Russian entrepreneur. He played a key role in a Russian intelligence operation against the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in which he instigated his accomplices to procure highly classified information from the BND and to pass it to the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB).

Therefore, Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security in the Federal Republic of Germany by attempting to destabilise the constitutional order.

16.12.2024

11.

Olga Alekseevna BELYAVTSEVA

(Ольга Алексеевна БЕЛЯВЦЕВА)

a.k.a.

Olha Oleksiyivna BIELIAVTSEVA;

Olga Alekseevna BELJIAWZEWA;

Olga Aleksevna MIZAEV

Entrepreneur

DOB: 25.10.1969

POB: Lipetsk, USSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: female

Passport No 768613166 (Russian Federation)

Tax Identification Number (INN): 481100083621

Olga Alekseevna Belyavtseva is a Russian entrepreneur. She is the wife and business partner of Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev. She is associated with Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev through the co-ownership of the two Russia-based Limited Liability Companies ‘OOO Agronom-sad’ and ‘OOO Biplast’. She founded those companies and was the single shareholder before transferring 30 % of the shares for each company after their marriage in 2018. Moreover, Belyavtseva and Mizaev had a similar ownership arrangement over the company Agronom-Sad Trading before Mizaev sold his shares to Belyavtseva on 22 February 2023 in direct temporal connection with Visa Mizaev’s involvement in the Russian intelligence operation against the Federal Republic of Germany, providing Mizaev with additional liquidity and concealing his asset base.

Therefore, Olga Alekseevna Belyavtseva supports natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security of the Federal Republic of Germany. She is also associated with Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev.

16.12.2024

12.

Timofey Vyacheslavovich BORDACHEV

(Russian: Тимофей Вячеславович БОРДАЧЕВ)

Political scientist

DOB: 28.1.1973

POB: St. Petersburg, USSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Timofey Vyacheslavovich Bordachev is a Russian political scientist and international affairs specialist. He is the Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, Academic Supervisor of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics, as well as member of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy.

Through his activities, he substantially contributes to the ideological base and rationalisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and aggressive policies of the Kremlin, including by promoting the view that neither Ukraine as a state nor its government are legitimate.

Therefore, Timofey Vyacheslavovich Bordachev is responsible for or supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine by engaging in and supporting the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

16.12.2024

13.

Harouna DOUAMBA

Businessman, director of the Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l’investissement

DOB: 8.1.1973

POB: Cocody, Ivory Coast

Nationality: Ivorian

Gender: male

Harouna Douamba is an Ivorian businessman, and the head of a pro-Russian, anti-Western disinformation network in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Burkina Faso.

In 2011, Douamba founded a non-governmental organisation called Aimons Notre Afrique (ANACOM) in the CAR. That organisation received funding from Lobaye Invest, which has been associated with the Wagner Group. In 2022, Harouna Douamba established the Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'Investissement (GPCI) in Burkina Faso. GPCI has been involved in covert influence operations.

Harouna Douamba’s disinformation networks were dismantled by Meta in May 2021, and later in May 2023. Despite this, GPCI-related disinformation groups are still active and running structured and coordinated disinformation campaigns, with the use of a vast network of information chains. Those campaigns target France in particular, including through accusations of conspiracy, terrorism, destabilisation operations or preparing coups against the Union or its Member States.

Therefore, Harouna Douamba is supporting and implementing actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State or in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

16.12.2024

14.

Anatolii PRIZENKO

Businessman

DOB: 26.11.1974

POB: Moldovan SSR (now Republic of Moldova)

Nationality: Moldovan

Gender: male

Anatolii Prizenko is a businessman in the Republic of Moldova. In late October 2023, he coordinated the dispatch of several citizens of the Republic of Moldova to France, where they painted the Star of David on the streets in exchange for financial compensation. That operation was widely reported by the media and had a significant destabilising effect in the context of the conflict between Israel and Hamas following the attacks on 7 October 2023. Images of that operation were first spread by the Recent Reliable News media network, which is associated with the Government of the Russian Federation and used by Russian actors to conduct disinformation campaigns.

Anatolii Prizenko publicly took responsibility for his role as the organiser of that operation. According to media reports, that destabilising operation was carried out for the benefit of the Russian military intelligence service, the GRU, and aimed at fuelling tensions in French society.

Therefore, Anatolii Prizenko is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability in a Member State and, therefore, in the Union by planning, directing, or engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

16.12.2024

15.

Alesia MILORADOVICH or Alesya MILORADOVICH or Olesya MILORADOVIC

Алеся МИЛОРАДОВИЧ or Олеся МИЛОРАДОВИЧ

Russian Government employee,

‘Foreign Affairs Facilitator’

Associate of the project ‘Foreign journalists for Russia’ (‘Инностранные журналисты за Россию’)

DOB: 10.3.1968

POB: Angarsk, USSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: female

Alesya Miloradovich is a collaborator of the Government of the Russian Federation in France, and calls herself a ‘foreign affairs facilitator’.

Alesya Miloradovich organised a so-called ‘electoral observation’ mission in the Ukrainian territories illegally occupied by Russia, in the context of the referendum on the annexation of those regions to Russia, and recruited French nationals who participated in the mission. She publicly admitted that she did this for the benefit of the Russian Government.

She was also a co-organiser of trips for French children to the Artek International Children Center in illegally annexed Crimea, which were funded by the Government of the Russian Federation. She has also been involved in the Russian propaganda project ‘Foreign journalists for Russia’ and has participated in spreading pro-Russian views, including by claiming that French and Western societies support Russian actions against Ukraine.

Therefore, Alesya Miloradovich is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process of a third country, including by attempting to destabilise its constitutional order.

16.12.2024

16.

Oleg Sergeevich EREMENKO

(Russian: Олег Сергеевич ЕРЕМЕНКО)

Representative of Officers of Russia, former GRU officer

DOB: 18.5.1978

POB: Bischkek, Kyrgyz SSR (now Kyrgyzstan)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: Male

Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is a former GRU officer and an active member of various Russian influence groups. Notably, he is a member of ‘Officers of Russia’ an organisation used by the Russian military and security services to influence domestic politics by cultivating links to veterans amongst the Russian diaspora and to retired military and security personnel of former Soviet-allied armed forces, in which he serves as their main representative in Germany. In that capacity, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is associated with the EU designated entities Rossotrudnitschestvo, which is the operator of the ‘Russian House’ in Berlin, and the Wagner Group. In his role as an envoy of the Russian state security apparatus, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is cultivating links to and supporting anti-democratic organisations within Germany. He is well connected with far-left anti-democratic groups and groups of former personnel of outlawed GDR security services and veterans of GDR military formations, such as Desant e.V., a pro-Russian association of former paratroopers.

Therefore, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Federal Republic of Germany by undermining the democratic political process, including by attempting to destabilise its constitutional order.

16.12.2024

17.

Alik Yuryevich KHUCHBAROV

Alik Yuryevich HUCHBAROV

Alik HUTŠBAROV

(Russian: Алик Юрьевич ХУЧБАРОВ)

Function: GRU operative

DOB: 12.11.1992

Nationality: Russian, Estonian

Gender: male

Tax identification number: 601515903509

Alik Khuchbarov was reponsible for planning and preparing an operation in Estonia, which entailed damaging the property of public figures who have spoken out against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as defacing monuments related to World War II. In doing so, he acted under the direction, in the interests and at the request of Russia’s military foreign intelligence agency (GRU) to hire perpetrators to carry out the attacks. In the attacks, vehicles of the Estonian Minister of the Interior as well as of the editor-in-chief of a Russian-language newspaper were targetted. The security services of Estonia prevented further attacks targeting more public figures. In addition, several war memorials in Estonia were defaced, with paint thrown on them and swastikas drawn on them. The aim of the operation was to create fear, panic and tension in Estonian society, and to intimidate persons critical of Russian actions and policies.As a collaborator in the GRU’s network, Alik Khuchbarov is responsible for implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State through planning and directing acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation.

20.5.2025

18.

Ilya Sergeevich BOCHAROV

Ilja BOTŠAROV

(Russian: Илья Сергеевич БОЧАРОВ)

Function: GRU operative

DOB: 29.6.1991

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Tax identification number: 561410364291

Ilya Bocharov was reponsible for planning and preparing an operation in Estonia, which entailed damaging the property of public figures who have spoken out against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as defacing monuments related to World War II. In doing so, he acted under the direction, in the interests and at the request of Russia’s military foreign intelligence agency (GRU) to hire perpetrators to carry out the attacks. In the attacks, vehicles of the Estonian Minister of the Interior as well as of the editor-in-chief of a Russian-language newspaper were targetted. The security services of Estonia prevented further attacks targeting more public figures. In addition, several war memorials in Estonia were defaced, with paint thrown on them and swastikas drawn on them. The aim of the operation was to create fear, panic and tension in Estonian society, and to intimidate persons critical of Russian actions and policies.As a collaborator in the GRU’s network, Ilya Bocharov is responsible for implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State through planning and directing acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation.

20.5.2025

19.

Elena KOLBASNIKOVA

(Russian: Елена КОЛБАСНИКОВА

Nationality: Ukrainian, Russian

DOB: 20.3.1975

POB: Dnipro, Ukraine SSR (now Ukraine)

Gender: female

Elena Kolbasnikova is a Russian national who has close ties with, and is financially supported by, Rossotrudnitschestwo, a Russian state entity. Kolbasnikova formed political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine. She was sentenced for hate speech in a court of final instance in Germany in regard to her undermining of Ukrainian sovereignty and denouncement of German public institutions. Criminal investigations are ongoing in regard to her support of separatists in the Donbas with military hardware, through fundraisers and the provision of aid to separatist groups. Moreover, Kolbasnikova promoted violent acts committed by her husband, Rostislav Teslyuk, against counter-demonstrators, and organised car rallies to intimidate Ukrainian minors seeking refuge in Germany.

She thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. She also supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine), through instigating or facilitating an armed conflict, by supporting separatist movements in Ukraine.

Elena Kolbasnikova is associated with Rostislav Teslyuk, through joint efforts in destabilising activities.

20.5.2025

20.

Hüseyin DOGRU

Address: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, Türkiye

Nationality: Turkish

Gender: male

Hüseyin Doğru is the founder and representative of AFA Medya A.Ș. which is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ș. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and shares deep structural ties, including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations.

RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas.

During a violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, RED personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate images of their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through their online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform, facilitating the violent nature of the protest.

Through AFA Medya, Hüseyin Doğru thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in coordinated information manipulation.

20.5.2025

21.

Yulia Sergeevna PROKHOROVA

(Russian: Юлия Сергеевна ПРОХОРОВА)

Nationality: Russian

DOB: 18.2.1992

Address: Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates.

Formerly Landshut, Bavaria, Germany

Gender: female

Yulia Prokhorova is a Russian citizen. She resided in Germany until 2024. Yulia Prokhorova sustains a social media campaign in which she promoted the intentional wasting of energy in Germany, seeking to support Russia’s war of aggression. In parallel, she disseminates misinformation in Russian state media about the energy supply, the rule of law, and Ukrainian refugees in Germany.

In addition, Yulia Prokhorova intimidated Ukrainian refugees in Europe through public assaults and other forms of harassment, which she recorded and disseminated online.

Yulia Prokhorova thus supports actions and policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one Member State by engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and indirectly supporting actions targeted at economic activities and services of public interest.

20.5.2025

22.

Rostislav TESLYUK

(Russian: Ростислав ТЕСЛЮК)

Alias

Max SCHLUND

(Russian: Макс ШЛУНД)

Nationality: Russian

DOB: 23.4.1982

POB: Moscow

Gender: male

Rostislav Teslyuk is a Russian national who has close ties with, and is financially supported by, Rossotrudnitschestwo, a Russian state entity. Rostislav Teslyuk formed political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine. Criminal investigations in regard to his support of separatists in the Donbas with military hardware are ongoing. Rostislav Teslyuk committed violent acts against counter-demonstrators and organised car rallies to intimidate Ukrainian minors seeking refuge in Germany, together with Elena Kolbasnikova.

He thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State (Germany) through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. He is also responsible for actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine) through instigating or facilitating an armed conflict, by his support for separatist movements in Ukraine.

Rostislav Teslyuk is associated with Elena Kolbasnikova, who is subject to restrictive measures, through joint efforts in destabilising activities.

20.5.2025

23.

Alina LIPP

Function: war correspondent

DOB: 17.9.1993

POB: Hamburg

Nationality: German

Gender: female

Alina Lipp runs the blog “Neues aus Russland”, in which she systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment as regards support for Ukraine.

Furthermore, she is using her role as a war correspondent with the Russian armed forces in eastern Ukraine to spread Russian war propaganda. She regularly appears in troop entertainment and propaganda shows on the Russian military TV channel Zvezda.

Thus, Alina Lipp is engaging in and supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten security and stability in the Union and in a third country (Ukraine) through the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference, and through facilitating an armed conflict in a third country.

20.5.2025

24.

Viktor Volodymyrovych MEDVEDCHUK

(Ukrainian: Віктор Володимирович МЕДВЕДЧУК)

(Russian: Виктор Владимирович МЕДВЕДЧУК)

Function: Politician, businessman, de facto media owner

DOB: 7.8.1954

POB: Pochet, Krasnoyarskyi Krai, Russian SFSR, USSR

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Address: Moscow

Ukrainian Tax ID (Код ДРФО): 1994214296 (void)

Viktor Medvedchuk is a former Ukrainian politician and businessman, who has been the leading proponent of a pro-Russian policy in Ukraine and who has promoted policies and actions intended to erode the credibility and legitimacy of the Government of Ukraine. Viktor Medvedchuk has close personal ties to, and is associated with, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin.

Through his associates, including Artem Marchevskyi, Viktor Medvedchuk controlled Ukrainian media outlets and used them to disseminate pro-Russian propaganda in Ukraine and beyond. After the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Viktor Medvedchuk spread Russian propaganda narratives about the war, undermining Ukrainian sovereignty. To that end, in April 2023, Viktor Medvedchuk founded a political movement in Russia called “Another Ukraine”.

With his associates and associated entities, including Artem Marchevskyi and the Voice of Europe media channel, and in close coordination with the Russian authorities, Viktor Medvedchuk has continued funding and carrying out influence operations targeting political parties and individual politicians in Europe. Those activities aimed to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and to spread its influence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections. Those activities included providing financial resources to individual political actors in Europe, including selected candidates in the European Parliament elections, and for cooperation with journalists. Viktor Medvedchuk has directed and maintained control over the malign activities of Artem Marchevskyi and Voice of Europe, using Artem Marchevskyi’s de facto direction of Voice of Europe.

Therefore, Viktor Medvedchuk is responsible for, implementing, supporting, or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in a third country, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through planning, directing, engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference.

20.5.2025

25.

Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKYI

Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKIJ

Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKIY

Artěm Pavlovič MARČEVSKIJ

(Ukrainian: Артем Павлович МАРЧЕВСЬКИЙ)

(Russian: Артем Павлович МАРЧЕВСКИЙ)

Function: Politician, media producer, propagandist

DOB: 5.7.1988

POB: Kyiv, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, (now Ukraine)

Nationality: Ukrainian, Israeli

Gender: male

Address: Hovorčovická 1079, 250 65 Líbeznice, Czech Republic

Ukrainian Tax ID (Код ДРФО): 3232824038

Artem Marchevskyi is a former Ukrainian politician closely associated with Viktor Medvedchuk, a former Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close connections to the Government of the Russian Federation. By virtue of his position in the pro-Russian party “Opposition Platform – For Life” and in a TV channel involved in pro-Russian propaganda, Artem Marchevskyi supported and provided assistance to Viktor Medvedchuk in the years 2018 to 2021. Artem Marchevskyi and Viktor Medvedchuk continued to coordinate after they both left Ukraine following the Russian invasion in 2022, with Viktor Medvedchuk directing and controlling Artem Marchevskyi’s activities facilitating construction of Medvedchuk’s influence network in the Union and its Member States.

Artem Marchevskyi has played an instrumental role in disseminating concerted disinformation and biased narratives aimed at supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and spreading its influence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, by undermining the credibility and public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression. Artem Marchevskyi played a key role in the acquisition of the media brand “Voice of Europe” and the incorporation of its activity in a company of the same name. As the concealed head of Voice of Europe, Artem Marchevskyi has used the company to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists, and to build an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe.

Therefore, Artem Marchevskyi is responsible for actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process and through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference.

20.5.2025

26.

Natallia SUDLIANKOVA

A.k.a.:

Natallia SUDLENKOVA

Natalia SUDLENKOVA

Natalia SUDLIANKOVÁ (ŠEVKOVÁ)

Natalija SUDLIANKOVÁ (ŠEVKOVÁ)

(Russian: Наталья СУДЛЕНКОВА (ШЕВКО))

Alias:

Natalyia KORNELYUK

(Russian: Наталья КОРНЕЛЮК)

Function: Journalist, Media and PR Consultant, Coordinator

DOB: 9.6.1964

POB: Belarus

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: female

Address: Borovanského 2381/22, 155 00 Prague, Czech Republic

Identity documents: Travel document: U0002974, valid until 18.3.2031

Residence Permit: 001631077, valid until 13.3.2034

Natallia Sudliankova is a journalist and a media and PR consultant who has been producing custom-made media products that included information manipulation and spreading misleading narratives aiming to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and aiming to undermine the public trust towards Czech national and European Union democratic values and processes. Sudliankova has been receiving assignments over a long period of time and has been financially rewarded.

She plays a significant role in planning and directing coordinated information manipulation intended for the public in the Czech Republic and in other Member States, and cooperates with Russian state entities (Rosatom, Pravfond), entities representing the interests of the Russian Federation (Immortal Regiment of Russia), and Alexey Nikolayevich Shavrov, an officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU).

Therefore, Natallia Sudliankova is responsible for actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation.

20.5.2025

27.

Iurie NECULITI

(Russian: Юрие НЕКУЛИТИ)

Function: CEO of Stark Industries

Nationality: of the Republic of Moldova

Gender: male

Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of Moldova

POB: Bender, Republic of Moldova

Iurie Neculiti is CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.

Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.

Therefore, as CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.

Iurie Neculiti is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Stark Industries.

20.5.2025

28.

Ivan NECULITI

(Russian: Иван НЕКУЛИТИ)

Function: Owner of Stark Industries and PQ Hosting

Nationality: of the Republic of Moldova

Gender: male

Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of Moldova

POB: Bender, Republic of Moldova

Ivan Neculiti is the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.

Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.

Ivan Neculiti is associated with Iurie Neculiti and Stark Industries.

Therefore, as the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. Ivan Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and in a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.

20.5.2025

29.

Andrei KHARKOVSKY

(Russian: Андрей ХАРКОВСКИЙ)

Function: Leading member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad

Nationality: Russian

POB: Tomsk Region, Russia

Gender: male

Address: Germany

Andrei Kharkovsky is a Russian citizen living in Germany. In Germany, Kharkovsky functions as a representative of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad, including by organising military-style gatherings for its members. The Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad is an entity linked to the Government of the Russian Federation, and partaking in Russia’s war of aggression and acts of violence in Ukraine in support of pro-Russian separatists under the premise of a “historical mission” to reinstate Russian control over southern and eastern Ukraine. As a member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad, Kharkovsky is engaging in acts of violence.

Andrei Kharkovsky is therefore supporting actions of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the sovereignty and security of Ukraine by attempting to overthrow the constitutional order of Ukraine.

20.5.2025

30.

Anatoli Yurevich ABRAMOV

(Russian: Анатолий Юрьевич АБРАМОВ)

Function: Director of the General Radio Frequency Centre branch in the Northwestern Federal District

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Anatoly Abramov is the director of the General Radio Frequency Centre’s Northwestern Federal District branch. Branch heads are appointed and dismissed by the Director of the GRFC in agreement with Roskomnadzor, and act on behalf of the GRFC.

He oversees the use of radio frequencies and devices in the Kaliningrad region.

Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.

Therefore, Anatoly Abramov is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States, through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure.

20.5.2025

31.

Ruslan Vasilyevich NESTERENKO

(Russian: Руслан Васильевич НЕСТЕРЕНКО)

Function: Acting General Director of the GRFC

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Ruslan Nesterenko is the acting general director of the General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC). He oversees the use of radio frequencies and ensures compliance with legislation.

Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, Russia, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States and disrupting civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.

Under Nesterenko’s direction, the GRFC is involved in planning and supporting information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States. As per the GRFC Charter, the general director represents the enterprise’s interests within Russia and beyond its borders.

Therefore, Ruslan Nesterenko is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

20.5.2025

32.

Viktor Aleksandrovitch LUKOVENKO

(Russian: Виктор Александрович ЛУКОВЕНКО)

Alias

Viktor VASILEV

(Russian: Виктор ВАСИЛЬЕВ)

Function: Head of the news agency “African Initiative”

DOB: 6.4.1985

Nationality: Uzbek

Gender: male

Viktor Lukovenko has been active on the African continent for several years, previously as a member of the Wagner Group and now as the head of the news agency “African Initiative”. He is involved in spreading Russian propaganda on the continent. He is linked to well known figures of Russian propaganda in Africa. Additionally, Viktor Lukovenko was sent to Ukraine in 2022 before the war, under the supervision of a GRU colonel, in order to recruit pro-Russian sympathisers.

Viktor Lukovenko is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly and indirectly, supporting and facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

20.5.2025

33.

Oleg Anatoliyovych VOLOSHIN

(Ukrainian: Олег Анатолійович ВОЛОШИН)

(Russian: Олег Анатольевич ВОЛОШИН)

Nationality: Russian

DOB: 7.4.1981

POB: Nikolaev, USSR (now Ukraine)

Passport No.: ET870130

ID-No.: 1981040705733; 2968200719

Gender: male

Oleg Voloshin is a former Ukrainian member of parliament and a member of the pro-Russian political party “Opposition Platform – For Life” (OPFL). He is part of the network behind “Voice of Europe” and is active at Golos.eu and PolitWera, both platforms spreading disinformation and pro-Russian narratives. He was involved in bribe payments made to Western politicians.

Oleg Voloshin has used his position as Ukrainian delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2019-2023) to implement the strategy of Russian interference in Europe led by pro-Russian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, who leads OPFL.

In particular, Voloshin has promoted Medvedchuk’s “peace plan” for Ukraine, which is linked to the Russian narrative regarding Russia’s war of aggression. In order to win-over European elected representatives to his cause, he has organised conferences with French and German parliamentarians, arguing that the “Normandy format” (France, Germany, Ukraine, Russia) has a so-called parliamentary dimension outside any official framework. The most recent event was organised by Voloshin at the French Senate on 11 February 2022 (“Peace process in Ukraine: how to break the deadlock”), a few days before the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army.

Thus, Oleg Voloshin is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union and its Member States, including Germany, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly and indirectly, the obstruction and undermining of the democratic political process.

20.5.2025

34.

Justin Blaise TAGOUH

(Russian: Жюстин Блез ТАГУ)

Function: CEO of press group International Afrique Media (IAM), which includes the TV channel Afrique Média, IAM press review, and Courrier Confidentiel

DOB: 1959

Gender: male

Justin Tagouh is CEO of the press group International Africa Media. This media group has direct links with the Russian authorities, and spreads Russian narrative and anti-western narrative in African countries.

Justin Tagouh is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

20.5.2025

35.

Mikhaïl Mikhaïlovich PRUDNIKOV

Alias

“Micha”

(Russian: Михаил Михайлович ПРУДНИКОВ)

Function: Member of Africa Politology, entity responsible for disinformation and Russian propaganda in the Central African Republic

POB: Tambov Oblast

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Mikhaïl Prudnikov is a Russian disinformation activist operating in the Central African Republic (CAR) who has close links with the Wagner galaxy and disinformation campaign holdings in CAR through various newspapers and networks. In particular, he developed a narrative against western countries and participated in communication actions in order to undermine and threaten the Union’s image in the CAR.

Mikhaïl Prudnikov is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

20.5.2025

36.

Sylvain AFOUA

(Russian: Сильвен АФУА)

Alias

Egountchi BEHANZIN

(Russian: Эгунчи БЕХАНЗИН)

Function: Founder of the pan-African group “Ligue de défense noire Africaine” (LDNA); influencer/activist known by the pseudonym “Egountchi Behanzin”

DOB: 5.11.1988

POB: Madjikpeto, Togo

Nationality: French, Togolese

Gender: male

Website: www.egountchibehanzin.com

Sylvain Afoua is a pro-Russian activist, founder of the “Ligue de défense noire Africaine” (LDNA) (Black African Defence League), a group involved in hit actions on French territory. The structure was dissolved by a French ministerial decree of 29 September 2021 for spreading an ideology calling for hatred, discrimination and violence. Sylvain Afoua spreads Russian narratives and misinformation on the war of aggression against Ukraine, which he carries out in particular on the African continent. His message is transmitted via social networks and his association’s website. He is regularly invited to Russian fora and is, furthermore, financially linked to the Wagner Group.

Sylvain Afoua is therefore responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

20.5.2025

37.

Thomas RÖPER

(Russian: Томас РЁПЕР)

Function: war correspondent

DOB: 26.11.1971

POB: Bremen

Nationality: German

Gender: male

Thomas Röper is a German blogger. Through his network of online channels named “Anti-Spiegel”, he systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment regarding support to Ukraine.

Furthermore, he legitimises Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory by serving as an election “observer” and participating in a campaign to promote Russia’s illegal referendum on the secession from Ukraine of the Russian-occupied territories. Moreover, he has served as a spokesperson for the Government of the Russian Federationto disseminate Russian propaganda narratives, including at the UN Arria-forum.

Thomas Röper is therefore engaging in and supporting the use of information manipulation and interference and facilitates an armed conflict in a third country.

20.5.2025

38.

Nathalie YAMB

DOB: 22.7.1969

POB: La Chaux-de-Fonds, Switzerland

Nationality: Swiss and Cameroonian

Gender: female

Nathalie Yamb is a social media influencer. Since the Sochi summit she attended in 2019, Nathalie Yamb has been an outspoken supporter of Russia, adopting Moscow’s language and targeting France and the West in particular, with a view to ousting them from the African continent. She has specific ties with AFRIC, an organisation linked to Russian private military companies.

Therefore, Nathalie Yamb is supporting actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in its Member States by engaging in the use of information manipulation.

26.6.2025

39.

Andrey Yuryevich ROMANCHENKO

(Russian: Андрей Юрьевич РОМАНЧЕНКО)

Function: General Director of the Federal State-owned Enterprise ‘Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network’ (RTRS)

DOB: 16.10.1960

POB: Moscow, Russian SSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Russian Tax ID (ИНН): 771515786260

Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko is the General Director of The Federal State-owned Enterprise ‘Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network’ (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance, operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia. Romanchenko, who was appointed as General Director by the Russian President, directs the RTRS, which plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation by providing the infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called ‘All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels’ such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.

Under Romanchenko’s leadership, RTRS has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied territories is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the exclusive right to establish transmission infrastructure in the occupied territories. By overseeing and directing these operations, Romanchenko actively facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information, thereby assuming responsibility for the use of information manipulation.

Therefore, Romanchenko, as the head of RTRS, benefits from and implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

15.7.2025

40.

Vladimir NAIDENOV

(Russian: Владимир НАЙДЕНОВ)

Function: Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories of the Federal State-owned Enterprise ‘Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network’ (RTRS)

Gender: male

Nationality: Russian

Vladimir Naidenov is the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at the Federal State-owned Enterprise ‘Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network’ (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia. Vladimir Naidenov, is subordinated to the RTRS General Director Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko, who directs the RTRS and plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called ‘All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels’ such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.

In his position within the RTRS, Vladimir Naidenov has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there.

Therefore, Vladimir Naidenov, as the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at RTRS, facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information by coordinating the RTRS infrastructure development in the occupied Ukrainian territories and thus implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference

15.7.2025

41.

Dmitri BUIMISTRU

Function: TV presenter, actor; blogger

DOB: 26.11.1992

POB: Chișinău, Republic of Moldova

Nationality: Moldovan

Gender: male

Dmitri Buimistru intentionally engages in coordinated information manipulation and interference by operating as a key propagandist on MD24, a Russia-based online TV channel created by Ilan Shor following license withdrawals from his previous stations for disseminating Russian disinformation. To that end, Buimistru deliberately spreads demonstrably false claims – systematically debunked by independent fact-checkers – regarding NATO drawing Moldova into conflict, imminent revocation of constitutional neutrality, ‘Romanization’ of institutions, misrepresentation of the EU referendum’s constitutional implications, and fabricated trade statistics.

Furthermore, his participation in synchronised cross-platform disinformation campaigns is evidenced by the July 2023 Russian embassy surveillance equipment scandal, where his messaging was perfectly coordinated with other pro-Kremlin outlets, demonstrating centralised orchestration. In addition, Buimistru’s ‘SOSEDI’ project has been identified as a key tool in a broader external influence operation. His systematic promotion of other pro-Russian information sources and deployment of consistent messaging tactics specifically designed to undermine Moldova’s sovereignty, European integration, and democratic processes further confirms his deliberate engagement in coordinated information manipulation with a view to serving Russian destabilisation interests in Moldova.

Therefore, Dmitri Buimistru is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability in a third country through engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

15.7.2025

42.

Veaceslav VALICO

Function: Activist

DOB: 10.8.1977

POB: Chișinău, Republic of Moldova

Nationality: Moldovan

Gender: male

Veaceslav Valico participated, alongside Anatolii Prizenko, a natural person listed by the Union, in the Russian destabilisation operation concerning the painting of the Star of David on the streets of Paris following the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel in exchange for financial compensation and in order to create tensions in French society.

Moreover, Veaceslav Valico is involved in the systematic dissemination of disinformation in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, as part of the Russian Federation’s malign hybrid activities.

Furthermore, Veaceslav Valico is associated with Anatolii Prizenko, who is an individual listed by the Union. Their association predates their collaboration in the Paris incident.

Therefore, Veaceslav Valico is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the stability in a Member State and therefore, in the Union, and in third countries, through planning, directing, and engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

15.7.2025

43.

Simeon BOIKOV

Function: Pro-Russian blogger

Date of birth: 15.2.1990

Place of birth: Sydney, Australia

Gender: male

Nationality: Australian/Russian

Simeon Boikov is an Australian pro-Russian activist known by the pseudonym ‘Aussie Cossack’. He is recognised for disseminating pro-Kremlin narratives and misinformation, particularly regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Boikov has also been implicated in spreading disinformation related to the 2024 U.S. presidential election, notably by paying an American influencer to post a Storm-1516 fabricated video falsely depicting voter fraud in Georgia.

Therefore, Simeon Boikov is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

15.7.2025

44.

Vitaly KULIKOV

(Russian: Виталий КУЛИКОВ)

Function: Lieutenant Colonel in the Russian military, heading the Electronic Warfare (EW) center of the Baltic Fleet

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Lieutenant Colonel Vitaly Kulikov is the commander of the Electronic Warfare (EW) center of the Baltic Fleet also known as the 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center. Vitaly Kulikov oversees exercises of his EW troops in the Kaliningrad region.

GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and ‘spoofing’ of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation.

The EW center of the Baltic Fleet, under Kulikov’s commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas, and is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States.

Therefore, Vitaly Kulikov is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.

15.7.2025

45.

Yuri Illarionovich LASTOCHKIN

(Russian: Юрий Илларионович ЛАСТОЧКИН

Ukrainian: Юрій Iлларіонович ЛАСТОЧКIН)

Function: Official of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Military Leader; General-Major/Lieutenant General; Chief of the Electronic Warfare Forces of the Russian Federation/head of Russian Defense Ministry’s Radio-Electronic Warfare (REB) force

DOB: 18.8.1967

POB: Rzhavka, Mogilev region, Belarusian SSR (now Belarus)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Lieutenant General Yuri Lastochkin is the chief of the Electronic Warfare (EW) Forces of the Russian Federation. Yuri Lastochkin oversees actions and exercises of Russia’s EW troops, including those of the 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region.

Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and ‘spoofing’ of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation.

The 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region, under Lastochkin’s commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas; it is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States.

Therefore, Y. I. Lastochkin is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.

15.7.2025

46.

Yevgeny Shevchenko

(Russian: Евгений ШЕВЧЕНКО)

Function: Founder of TigerWeb

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Tax identification number: 910202780107

Yevgeny Shevchenko is a web developer who has specialised in creating websites for many years. He is the founder of Tigerweb, the web-company that runs the informational manipulation set ‘Portal Kombat’ which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, on several so-called ‘informational portals’. Therefore, he is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

15.7.2025

47.

Aleksey Nikolayevich SHAVROV

(Russian: Алексей Николаевич ШАВРОВ)

a.k.a. Andrey PETROV

(Russian: Андрей ПЕТРОВ)

Function: Military Intelligence Officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU)

DOB: 12.12.1989

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Aleksey Shavrov is a GRU officer involved in Russian influence operations directed to destabilise the Union and its Member States. Aleksey Shavrov's malign activities include information manipulation and disinformation campaigns in the Czech Republic and other Union Member States. Through his concealed associate, Natallia Sudliankova, Aleksey Shavrov conducts influence campaigns, including by organising the dissemination of tailor-made articles in various European media outlets. Misleading or outright false narratives aim to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and to spread its influence. Moreover, the content is designed to further undermine public trust in the Union values and processes, democracy and Union cohesion. Articles also contain specific manipulative anti-NATO, anti-Ukraine and anti-NGO narratives. Aleksey Shavrov instructed Natallia Sudliankova to spread and disseminate those divisive messages through media to amplify their polarising content. Aleksey Shavrov provided financial rewards for accomplishing tasks and for publication of those custom-made pro-Russian media campaigns.

Therefore, Aleksey Shavrov is implementing actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

15.7.2025

Name

Identifying information

Statement of reasons

Date of listing

1.

GRU Unit 29155

ФКУ ‘Войсковая Часть 29155

Place of registration: 105077, Moscow 11th Parkovaya Street, 38A

Registration No: 7719737879

OGRN: 1097746770395

GRU Unit 29155 is a covert unit within the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU), known for its involvement in foreign assassinations and destabilisation activities across Europe. Through coups, assassinations, bombings, and cyberattacks against other countries around the world in connection with the war in Ukraine, it has sought to create chaos and destabilise European Union countries. By carrying out such actions, it seeks to help and benefit Russia. GRU Unit 29155 carried out cyberattacks and other attacks against critical infrastructure. Therefore, it is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating acts of violence, as well as planning, directing, engaging in, supporting or otherwise facilitating any actions aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure.

16.12.2024

2.

Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l’Investissement

GPCI

Place of registration: Lomé, Togo

Date of registration: January 2022

Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l’Investissement (GPCI) is a disinformation network carrying out pro-Russian covert influence operations, particularly in the Central African Republic and Burkina Faso. GPCI was dismantled by Meta in May 2023. Despite this, GPCI is still active and is running structured and coordinated disinformation campaigns with the use of a vast network of information chains. Those campaigns target France in particular, including through accusations of conspiracy, terrorism, destabilisation operations or preparing coups against the Union or its Member States. GPCI has been indirectly funded by the Wagner Group.

Therefore, GPCI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

16.12.2024

3.

African Initiative

Place of Registration: Moscow, Russia

Date of registration: September 2023

African Initiative is a news agency that operates on the African continent. It has been involved in spreading Russian propaganda and disinformation against the West, and has hired journalists and influencers for the purpose of spreading Russian propaganda. It has also organised press tours for African journalists in the illegally occupied territories of Ukraine, during which pro-Russian narratives about the war were spread. African Initiative has also organised events serving the interests of the Government of the Russian Federation, including by facilitating access to mineral resources.

Therefore, African Initiative is responsible for or supporting actions and policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability and security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

16.12.2024

4.

AFA Media aka RED

AFA Medya Anonim Șirketi aka RED

AFA Медиа

Address: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, Türkiye

Type of entity: media company

Place of registration: Istanbul

Date of registration: 22.11.2022

VAT Nr.: 0081804196

Registration number 423277-5

Principle place of business: Türkiye

Website: https://thered.stream/imprint/

Founder: Hüseyin Dogru

AFA Medya A.Ș. is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ș. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and which shares deep structural ties including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations.

RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas.

During the violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, Red personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through RED’s online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform.

AFA Medya Anonim Șirketi thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation that undermine stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in information manipulation.

20.5.2025

5.

Voice of Europe

(Russian: Голос Европы)

Address: Krakovská 583/9, 110 00 Prague, Czech Republic

Website: www.voiceofeurope.com, www.voiceofeurope.eu

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company (s.r.o.)

Place of registration: Prague

Date of registration: 14.3.2023

Registration number: CZ05185327

Principal place of business: Czech Republic

Voice of Europe is an online media outlet, engaged in a systematic international campaign of media manipulation and distortion of facts through its website and accounts on Facebook, YouTube, Telegram and X. Voice of Europe disseminated concerted disinformation related to Ukraine, the Union and its Member States with the aim of supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation. It systematically undermined the public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression, and the credibility of the assistance of the Union and its Member States to Ukraine’s defence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections.

Through its activities, Voice of Europe is implementing and supporting actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

Voice of Europe was secretly financed and directed by Viktor Medvedchuk, a pro-Russian Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close ties to the leadership of the Russian Federation, through his associate Artem Marchevskyi. Voice of Europe was used to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists and the building an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe. Therefore, Voice of Europe was involved in activities facilitating the construction of Viktor Medvedchuk’s influence network in the Union and its Member States.

20.5.2025

6.

Norebo JSC

Address: Office 510, 43 Schmidta Street, 183038 Murmansk, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Joint Stock Company

Place of registration: Murmansk

Date of registration: 2.11.2007

Registration number: 1201000007889

TIN / KPP: 2901170107 / 519001001

Norebo JSC is a Russian fishing company. Vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC show particular movement patterns that are inconsistent with regular economic practices and fishing activities. The movement patterns align with malign objectives, such as repeatedly being in the vicinity of or loitering near critical infrastructure and military sites. The movement patterns have been linked, including by Member States and the authorities of third states, to the Russian state-sponsored surveillance campaign that employs inter alia, civilian fishing trawlers, to conduct espionage missions directed against civilian and military infrastructure in the North and Baltic Sea. Those activities can facilitate future sabotage operations. Shipping vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC have also been equipped with technology that may be used for espionage. A Norebo JSC vessel has been banned from entering Dutch port facilities due to espionage.

Norebo JSC has also received several loans from Sberbank, a Russian state-owned bank.

Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time.

Norebo JSC thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure.

20.5.2025

7.

Murman SeaFood

(Russian: Мурман СиФуд, Мурманские морепродукты)

Address: Ulitsa Karla Marksa, 28, Murmansk, Murmansk Oblast, Russian Federation, 183025

Type of entity: limited liability company

Place of registration: Murmansk

Murman SeaFood (MSF) is a Russian fishing company. Melkart-5 (Russian: Мелькарт-5), a vessel owned and operated by MSF, has repeatedly shown untypical behaviour inconsistent with its regular economic practices and fishing activities, including its presence in close vicinity to an ongoing NATO military exercise, and regular presence close to Norwegian critical infrastructure and military sites. In particular Melkart-5 showed highly unusual navigation practices in the immediate vicinity of a subsea cable in the Norwegian North Sea, crossing the cable multiple times, immediately before the cable was severely damaged. In addition, crew of Melkart-5 violated Norwegian on-shoring regulations while being caught setting off to investigate a Norwegian bridge critical for military logistic purposes in a clandestine manner.

Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time.

MSF thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure.

20.5.2025

8.

Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Main Radio Frequency Centre”

General Radio Frequency Centre

GRFC

Федеральное Государственное Унитарное Предприятие “Главный Радиочастотный Центр”

ФГУП “ГРЧЦ”

Address: 7, Derbenevskaya nab. 7 p., Moscow 115114. 15

115114, город Москва, Дербеневская наб, д. 7 стр. 15

Type of entity: Federal agency

Place of registration: Moscow, Russian Federation

Date of registration: 30.3.2001

BIN: 1027739334479

INN: 7706228218

KPP: 772501001

Principal place of business: Russia

The General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC) is responsible for ensuring the proper use of radio frequencies and devices for civil purposes, and monitors compliance with legislation. It is one of the main organisations which contribute to decisions about the use and supervision of the radio frequency sector.

Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.

The electronic warfare centre in Kaliningrad has received new jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.

Therefore, GRFC is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

20.5.2025

9.

Stark Industries Solutions Ltd.

Date of registration: 10.2.2022

Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom

(maildrop address)

Registration number: 13906017

Website: https://stark-industries.solutions/

Website: https://pq.hosting/

Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is owned and operated by the Moldavian nationals Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti, through the web hosting service PQ Hosting. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.

Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide those activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.

Therefore, Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.

Stark is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti.

20.5.2025

10.

Federal State-owned Enterprise ‘Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network’ (RTRS);

Федеральное государственное унитарное предприятие ‘Российская телевизионная и радиовещательная сеть’

Address: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, Russia

Website: https://moscow.rtrs.ru/

Place of registration: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, Russia

Date of registration: 30.11.2001

Registration number: ИНН: 7717127211; ОГРН: 1027739456084

The Federal State-owned Enterprise ‘Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network’ (RTRS) operatеs Russia’s terrestrial broadcasting infrastructure. It is directly subordinated to the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation and operates under the authority of a general director appointed by the Russian President. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called ‘All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels’ such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24. RTRS plays a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there.

Therefore, RTRS is implementing and benefiting from policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

15.7.2025

11.

841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center of the Baltic Fleet

841-й центр радиоэлектронной борьбы

Address: 238580, Kaliningrad oblast, Yantarny settlement, Balebin street, 09643

238580, Калининградская обл., пгт.Янтарный, ул.Балебина, в/ч 09643

Type of entity: Military unit

Place of registration: Kalininingrad region, Russian Federation

Phone number: 8(40153)37-244

Military unit 09643

The 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center is at the core of one of the strongest electronic warfare groups in Russia. The centre is responsible for using technology to disorganise any system of shortwave communication, conducting electronic warfare exercises (EW) to disrupt enemy navigation and radio communications as well as for the collection and analysis of intelligence information obtained by observing electromagnetic radiation in the short and ultrashort wave ranges.

Several European countries have experienced GPS signal failures, which have been attributed to electronic warfare activities by Russia, specifically from Kaliningrad. This includes deliberate jamming and ‘spoofing’ of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. Interference and manipulation of GPS signals has led to obstacles for landing civil planes.

The 841st Separate EW Center in Kaliningrad has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.

Therefore, 841st Separate EW Center, as part of Russia’s military forces enabling the misuse of radio frequency sector, is responsible for engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.

15.7.2025

12.

BRICS Journalist Association

Website: bricspress.live

The BRICS Journalists Association (BJA) is a Russian NGO linked to the Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI), created by Yevgeny Prigozhin, and headed by Oksana Vovk (Mira Terada). The BJA has been used as a vehicle to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and disinformation under the guise of independent journalism, including fake content originating from the Storm-1516 Information Manipulation Set (IMS).

Therefore, the BJA is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

15.7.2025

13.

Center for Geopolitical Expertise

Центр геополитических экспертиз, CGE

Website: cge.evrazia.ru, cge.su

Place of registration: Ul. Dinamovskaya D.1a, Office 409, Moscow, RUS, 109044

Date of registration: 17.12.2002

Registration number: 1027739806940

The Center for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE) is a Moscow-based think tank founded by Aleksandr Dugin, and headed by Valery Korovin, accused of orchestrating disinformation campaigns aimed at targeting Ukrainian interests, discrediting Western political figures, and influencing electoral processes in Western countries. CGE and its director, Valery Mikhaylovich Korovin, are reportedly involved in creating and disseminating false information by utilising artificial intelligence tools to produce deepfake videos, and supporting a network of hundreds of fake news websites. CGE is alleged to have worked closely with Russia’s military intelligence agency (GRU), receiving financial support to carry out these operations.

Therefore, the CGE is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

15.7.2025

14.

Foundation to Battle Injustice

Date of creation: 23.3.2021

Website: fondfbr.ru

The Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI) is a fake human-rights defence NGO created in March 2021 by Wagner group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. The R-FBI has been involved in numerous information operations targeting France and Ukraine, including a campaign accusing French soldiers of having kidnapped children from Niger just after the military coup d’état in 2023. Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023, the R-FBI has been involved in the amplification of numerous Storm-1516’s information operations.

Therefore, the R-FBI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

15.7.2025

15.

Tigerweb

Website: Tigerweb.ru

Place of registration: 295000, Krim Republic, Simferopol City, Oktyabirskaya Street, 3, Office 408

Date of registration: 2019

Registration number: 1199112018973

Tigerweb is the Russian Crimea-based web-company that operates the informational manipulation project ‘Portal Kombat’, which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, through various so-called ‘informational portals’.

Therefore, Tigerweb is involved in the implementation of actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

15.7.2025

ex

3303

Perfumes and toilet waters

ex

3304 00 00

Beauty or make-up preparations and preparations for the care of the skin (other than medicaments), including sunscreen or suntan preparations; manicure or pedicure preparations

ex

3305 00 00

Preparations for use on the hair

ex

3307 00 00

Pre-shave, shaving or aftershave preparations, personal deodorants, bath preparations, depilatories and other perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations, not elsewhere specified or included; prepared room deodorisers, whether or not perfumed or having disinfectant properties

ex

4015 19 00

Other

ex

4015 90 00

Other

ex

9020 00 00

Other breathing appliances and gas masks, excluding protective masks having neither mechanical parts nor replaceable filters

ex

4202 00 00

Trunks, suitcases, vanity cases, executive-cases, briefcases, school satchels, spectacle cases, binocular cases, camera cases, musical instrument cases, gun cases, holsters and similar containers; travelling-bags, insulated food or beverage bags, toilet bags, rucksacks, handbags, shopping-bags, wallets, purses, map-cases, cigarette-cases, tobacco-pouches, tool bags, sports bags, bottle-cases, jewellery boxes, powder-boxes, cutlery cases and similar containers, of leather or of composition leather, of sheeting of plastics, of textile materials, of vulcanised fibre or of paperboard, or wholly or mainly covered with such materials or with paper.

ex

4203 00 00

Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, of leather or composition leather

ex

6101 00 00

Men’s or boys’ overcoats, car coats, capes, cloaks, anoraks (including ski jackets), windcheaters, wind-jackets and similar articles, knitted or crocheted, other than those of heading 6103

ex

6102 00 00

Women’s or girls’ overcoats, car coats, capes, cloaks, anoraks (including ski jackets), windcheaters, wind-jackets and similar articles, knitted or crocheted, other than those of heading 6104

ex

6103 00 00

Men’s or boys’ suits, ensembles, jackets, blazers, trousers, bib and brace overalls, breeches and shorts (other than swimwear), knitted or crocheted

ex

6107 00 00

Men’s or boys’ underpants, briefs, nightshirts, pyjamas, bathrobes, dressing gowns and similar articles, knitted or crocheted

ex

6109 00 00

T-shirts, singlets and other vests, knitted or crocheted

ex

6111 00 00

Babies’ garments and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted

ex

6115 00 00

Pantyhose, tights, stockings, socks and other hosiery, incl. graduated compression hosiery (e.g., stockings for varicose veins) and footwear without applied soles, knitted or crocheted

ex

6116 00 00

Gloves, mittens and mitts, knitted or crocheted

ex

6201 00 00

Men’s or boys’ overcoats, car coats, capes, cloaks, anoraks (incl. ski jackets), windcheaters, wind-jackets and similar articles, other than those of heading 6203

ex

6203 00 00

Men’s or boys’ suits, ensembles, jackets, blazers, trousers, bib and brace overalls, breeches and shorts (other than swimwear)

ex

6204 00 00

Women’s or girls. suits, ensembles, jackets, blazers, dresses, skirts, divided skirts, trousers, bib and brace overalls, breeches and shorts (other than swimwear)

ex

6211 33 00

Of man-made fibres

ex

6211 39 00

Of other textile materials

ex

6401 00 00

Waterproof footwear with outer soles and uppers of rubber or of plastics, the uppers of which are neither fixed to the sole nor assembled by stitching, riveting, nailing, screwing, plugging or similar processes

ex

6402 91 00

Covering the ankle

ex

6403 40 00

Other footwear, incorporating a protective metal toecap

ex

6405 00 00

Other footwear

ex

6505 00 10

Of fur felt or of felt of wool and fur, made from the hat bodies, hoods or plateaux of heading 6501 00 00

ex

6505 00 30

Peaked caps

ex

6505 00 90

Other

ex

5702 91 00

Carpets and other textile floor coverings, woven, not tufted or flocked, whether or not made up, incl. Kelem, Schumacks, Karamanie and similar hand-woven rugs of wool or fine animal hair

ex

8414 51

Table, floor, wall, window, ceiling or roof fans, with a self-contained electric motor of an output not exceeding 125 W

ex

8414 59 00

Other

ex

8414 60 00

Hoods having a maximum horizontal side not exceeding 120 cm

ex

8418 10 00

Combined refrigerator-freezers, fitted with separate external door

ex

8418 21 00

Compression-type

ex

8418 29 00

Other

ex

8418 30 00

Freezers of the chest type, not exceeding 800 litres capacity

ex

8418 40 00

Freezers of the upright type, not exceeding 900 litres capacity

ex

8422 11 00

Of the household type

ex

8443 12 00

Offset printing machinery, sheet fed, office type (using sheets with one side not exceeding 22 cm and the other side not exceeding 36 cm in the unfolded state)

ex

8443 31 00

Machines which perform two or more of the functions of printing, copying or facsimile transmission, capable of connecting to an automatic data-processing machine or to a network

ex

8443 32 00

Other, capable of connecting to an automatic data-processing machine or to a network

ex

8443 39 00

Other

ex

8508 11 00

Of a power not exceeding 1 500 W and having a dust bag or other receptacle capacity not exceeding 20 l

ex

8708 00 00

Parts and accessories of the motor vehicles of headings 8701 to 8705